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Multiple dimensions of disruption, energy 
transitions and industrial policy 
Abstract 
In this perspective article, we critically explore ‘disruption’ in relation to sustainability transitions in 
the energy sector. Recognising significant ambiguity associated with the term, we seek to answer the 
question: What use has ‘disruption’ for understanding and promoting change towards low carbon 
energy futures. First, we outline that different understandings and dimensions of ‘system disruption’ 
exist with different linkages to institutional and policy change. This variety points out a need to 
research in more detail the particular effects of differing low-carbon innovations in terms of their 
disruptive consequences for whole socio-technical systems. Thus, disruption can be utilised as a useful 
conceptual tool for interrogating in more detail the ways in which energy systems are changing in 
particular contexts. Second, we reflect on the relationship between ‘green industrial policy’ and 
disruption. In some contexts ‘energy disruption’ has been facilitated by green industrial policy, and it 
would seem that the profound changes said to be on the horizon in terms of disruption are also a 
motivator of green industrial policy. New industrial policy can be an important way in which the 
negative consequences of disruptive change, such as job losses, can be managed and facilitated.  
 
1. The ‘Disruption’ of everything: just another buzzword? 
Discussions of ‘disruption’ have gained increasing traction in policy (European Commission, 2014; 
Innovate UK, 2017) and academia (e.g Nagy et al., 2015; Sioshani, 2017) alike. The term ‘disruptive 
technology’ was initially coined in 1995 (Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen and Rosenbloom, 
1995) and mainly used in the subsequent years to discuss the renewal of firms in the context of 
business and organisational studies. However, recently the term has become more prolific than ever, 
spurred on by apparent momentous changes in a range of sectors. These often interconnected 
developments include automation in transport, 3D printing, digitalisation, the ‘gig economy’ and 
‘smart’ energy. Definitions have been used further afield to discuss changes in education and health 
care (Horn and Staker, 2015; Hwang and Christensen, 2008). In an important online article for the New 
Yorker, Lepore (2014) cynically observed that today “everyone is either disrupting or being disrupted” 
and argued that “every era has a theory of rising and falling, of growth and decay…our era has 
disruption”. The ubiquity of the term is seen by many as being problematic, with suggestions that the 
theory of disruption may be “dead wrong” (Kitroeff, 2015) due to its vagueness and lack of definitional 
clarity, and that it is time to “retire” disruption, “Silicon valley’s emptiest buzzword” (Alexander, 2016). 
King and Baatartogtokh, (2015) inquire ‘how useful is a theory of disruption’?  
Indeed, with the ubiquity of the term, there is a danger that surrounds many popular academic 
‘buzzwords’, e.g. the nexus (Cairns and Krzywoszynska, 2016), in that the meaning is often vague or 
multiple interpretations exist, while simultaneously the term is employed in a normative way to justify 
a variety of disparate policy actions. Given the increasing use of the term disruption in (energy) policy, 
it is vital to ascertain how policy actors understand disruptive processes. A nature editorial on the 
subject of academic buzzwords cautions: “choose your buzzwords carefully” (Nature, 2016). With this 
in mind, we outline our perspective on disruption – highlighting that important dimensions exist 
worthy of further empirical interrogation of use for energy studies. Before we do so, we first briefly 
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discuss the term disruptive innovation highlighting some definitional issues and debates in Section 2. 
We move to discuss in Section 3 the importance of considering systemic understandings of disruption 
in the energy sector. In Section 4, we present the important role of green industrial policy in managing 
systemic disruptive effects of low carbon transitions, hitherto under-acknowledged in the literature. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Origins and critiques of ‘disruptive innovation’ 
Before discussing disruption in relation to energy, it is worth recapping briefly on some of the key 
points of discussion regarding disruptive innovation. The term emerged with the observation that 
incumbent firms had been incapable of ‘catching the wave’ of innovative technological developments 
due to their continued investment in products which suit existing customers rather than anticipating 
the emergence of new markets and investing in them (Bower and Christensen, 1995). Specific 
technological advances in which incumbent firms failed to respond adequately to keep their 
competitive advantage abounded in the 1990s, including the rise of Walmart, the difficulties facing 
Goodyear in terms of radial tire designs, Xerox missing out as Canon took over the small copier market, 
and Bucyrus-Eire losing trade as Caterpillar took over the excavator market (Bower and Christensen, 
1996).  
The two crucial distinctions outlined by Christensen (1997: xix) are between ‘sustaining’ and 
‘disruptive’ technologies: “some sustaining technologies can be discontinuous or radical in character, 
while others are of an incremental nature. What all sustaining technologies have in common is that 
they improve the performance of established products, along the dimensions of performance that 
mainstream customers in major markets have always valued.” Disruptive technologies on the other 
hand, are defined as those that “bring to the market a very different value proposition than has been 
available previously. Generally, disruptive technologies under-perform established products in 
mainstream markets. But they have other features that a few fringe (and generally new) customers 
value” (Christensen, 1997: xix). The only solution, argued Christensen (1997), for incumbent firms to 
‘confront’ disruption was to create a separate autonomous unit within their firm to align and create a 
business model around a particular disruption. The theory was updated by Christensen and Raynor 
(2003) to ‘disruptive innovation’ with the recognition that fundamental changes to business models 
could also cause disruption without any fundamental technological change. 
Since then a number of critiques have been raised. Chesbrough (2001) argued that analyses of 
disruptive innovation, and anticipating and predicting the effects of disruptive innovations, were 
problematic (1) due to the lack of precise and consistent terminology and (2) due to causal 
explanations being based on the particularities of a unique context and mainly from the USA. Another 
key critique was that the disruptive technology framework used past selective examples to suit a 
particular theory or ‘cherry picked’ examples and, while it was useful in identifying ex post disruptive 
innovations, could it identify disruptive innovations ex ante (Danneels, 2004)? This has led to the 
development of frameworks to ‘anticipate’ disruptive innovations (Paap and Katz, 2004), and to 
forecast the diffusion of disruptive innovations (Linton, 2002). However, a lack of ‘empirical clarity’ 
between what constitutes a ‘technological’ disruption as opposed to a ‘business model’ disruption 
makes accurate assessments and predictions of disruption complicated (Markides, 2006). Christensen 
has responded to some of the critique in an ongoing process of clarifying the theory of disruption 
(Christensen, 2006; Christensen et al., 2015). The issues of ambiguity surrounding the term relate, 
however, partly to the fact that the concept has expanded into areas, such as health and social care 
(Christensen et al., 2006) that operate in fundamentally different ways than the American-based start-
ups and incumbent companies. The new contexts to which the terms ‘disruptive innovation’ or 
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‘disruption’ are being applied, including health and social care, education, mobility and energy 
provision entail more socio-technical than firm-based characteristics, including values that extend 
from market performance and technological efficiency to public goods provision, welfare, social equity 
and environmental sustainability. Thus, from a socio-technical system perspective, ‘disruption’ 
benefits from new insights. 
3. The energy ‘disruption’: what’s the added value? 
 
We argue that ‘disruption’ is an important conceptual tool for analysing the ways in which socio-
technical (energy) systems are changing in particular contexts. This means that rather than a mere 
focus on firms and technologies, it is useful to analyse system change in terms of what dimensions of 
the system have been or are being disrupted – or need disruption to reach a more environmentally 
and socially sustainable society. We have elsewhere proposed that disruption can extend beyond 
technology to, at least, the following dimensions of socio-technical systems: the composition of actors 
and networks, market structures, dominant forms of business models, the division of ownership 
between different actors, and regulations and other institutional settings (Johnstone et al., 2017).  This 
implies that from a socio-technical system perspective, disruption portrays differently depending on 
whether only one or more of the dominant forms of dimensions have been disrupted.  
Disruption in actors and networks implies a shift in the power positions of actors, such as reduced 
importance of incumbent utilities, or significant changes in the key networks in the dominant socio-
technical system, including the entry of new actors. Disruption in market structures may, for example,  
involve a significant change in the institutional logics (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014) and a visible 
shift in consumer preferences (Dijk et al., 2016). Disruption in business models relate to how value is 
captured from technologies or services and who the key actors are delivering such value. For example, 
energy sector business models are changing from simply the provision of energy and heat by large 
utilities towards bundling of energy services to consumers, e.g., around smart homes (Midttun and 
Piccini, 2017) and community solar provider models (Burger and Luke, 2017). Such community 
ownership and consumers’ participation in the provision of electricity and heat (prosumers) are 
examples of how new business models also link to altered ownership structures. Finally, disruption of 
institutions geared around the old dominant socio-technical system (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014) 
means, for example, the removal of subsidy schemes supporting old technology (Kivimaa and Kern, 
2016) and the introduction of regulatory frameworks that allow new, potentially disruptive inventions 
to develop into widespread innovations. 
Many renewable energy technologies are considered disruptive, because they are provoking 
significant changes in the grid, business models and regulation simultaneously. This relates to a 
fundamental shift away from centralised grids with large production units and passive consumers to 
more decentralised forms of energy production and novel business models involving communities and 
citizens as active participants. Yet, at the same time, incumbent energy system actors are fighting 
back, for example, by large utilities buying up independent wind power developers to eliminate 
competition in the UK (Negro et al., 2012) or engaging in shaping emerging technological fields by 
creating more centralised models  (e.g. offering centrally located solar panels to the ownership of 
utility customers) to produce and sell renewable electricity in Finland (Apajalahti et al., 2017). This 
means that many incumbent utilities frame themselves as proponents of renewable energy, while 
simultaneously safeguarding the centralised utility model. Countries differ and, while disruption is 
seen to be well under way in Germany and Denmark –  not only through a larger share of renewable 
energy but also through changed actor positions, more decentralised business models and ownership 
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structures, and changed regulation – in countries, such as Finland and the United Kingdom (UK), more 
centralised systems are still in place. Yet, plummeting wholesale electricity prices seen across Europe 
are affecting the revenue streams of leading utilities, where conventional power plants are being 
priced off the market (The Economist, 2013a). These changes are dramatic in countries, such as 
Germany, where much renewable capacity is owned not by the utilities but by community energy 
groups and cooperatives.  
The effects of the growth of renewable generation on existing energy utilities across Europe are clear. 
What is less clear is how energy system disruption is occurring in different European countries and 
what the differences are in the ways in which disruption happens. For example, renewable energy has 
already gained a rather significant share of electricity production in many countries, effectively 
disrupting the fossil-fuel based market and business models that have long been in the hands of large 
utility companies. However, the implications of this change to the energy system differ radically 
depending on whether merely fuel sources have changed or also ownership models and regulatory 
structures have disrupted as well. The latter – as is evidenced in Germany and Denmark – have larger 
consequences, for example, for energy justice (through increased ownership of production by 
citizens), grid infrastructure (through increased small-scale distributed generation) and employment 
(through what type of companies/cooperatives employ people).  
Looking more closely at Germany, Denmark and the UK, differing aspects of systemic disruption can 
be observed (illustrated in Table 1), indicating that the nature of disruption differs based on context 
and that there is no centralised model for ‘clean disruption’. According to a Silicon Valley-based 
entrepreneur and author Tony Seba, who talks about clean energy disruption, new technological 
developments, including an increased use of solar energy, storage technologies and ICT, will 
fundamentally alter the ‘energy architecture’ of our lives, moving away from a resource-based (coal, 
gas, and uranium) system to an information-based one, the latter being fundamentally different and 
based on “zero marginal costs”. While “the energy and transportation industries have a business model 
similar to Kodak’s in that every time you flick a switch you pay a utility and flicking a switch requires 
additional costs in terms of resource extraction, new renewable energy technologies change the 
equation because “after you build a solar rooftop installation, the marginal cost of each additional unit 
of energy drops essentially to zero because the sun and the wind are free” (Seba 2014: 4). While his 
vision is more global and does not account for the context specificity we outline in Table 1, Seba does 
contend that also utility scale renewables are already disrupting the wholesale electricity market.  
Table 1: Aspects of energy system change in Denmark, Germany and UK 
 Denmark Germany  UK 
Technology Increasing penetration of 
wind power 
Large growth in wind and 
also PV since 2000 
Dominance of offshore 
wind; support for solar, 
onshore wind reduced or 
removed in 2015 
Grid Effects on the load balance 
of the grid 
Problems of surplus solar 
generation; leading to rises 
in grid frequency through 
rotating load 
Issues around changes in 
voltage and grid frequency 
Actors & networks New actors, e.g. “heavily 
active, responsive and 
reflexive consumer” 
(Karnøe and Garud, 2012; 
p.77) 
Key role for community 
energy groups and 
consumer-led solar 
production with 41% of the 
8GW of solar operated by 
individuals selling back to 
the grid 
Incumbent actors dominate 
and new actors do not have 
a significant role. Limited 
role for consumers at 
present as acknowledged 
by OFGEM (2017) 
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Market structures Early intervention;  
subsidies for wind 
technology manufacturers 
and production and early 
‘technology specific’ Feed-
in-Tariff’s from the 1990s 
Early ‘technology specific’ 
intervention for wind. EEG 
and feed-in-tariff’s 
established in 2000 
Market oriented; non-
technology specific support 
including. Non-fossil-fuels 
obligation and renewables 
obligation. Technology 
specific feed-in-tariffs 
introduced in 2010 
Business models Changes in business 
models, e.g. DONG’s 
climate partnerships 
offering consultancy and 
project management 
services around energy 
demand reduction 
Changes in business 
models, e.g. community-
owned solar and utilities 
searching for more service 
oriented consumer-led 
business models 
Major utility business 
models dominate. Lack of 
focus on service and 
consumer-driven business 
models as identified by 
OFGEM (2017) 
Ownership Cooperative ownership 
models; over 100,000 
people in wind 
cooperatives; 30% 
community benefit for large 
renewable projects. 
Half of renewable energy is 
citizen owned; majority of 
small and medium PV units 
are owned by private 
individuals (41.8%), farmers 
(22.5%) and SMEs (20.3%) 
–utilities have lost 97% of 
the PV electricity 
generation market 
Renewable energy assets 
mainly owned by existing 
utilities; less than 15% of 
renewable capacity is 
citizen owned; 5% 
community benefit for large 
renewable projects 
Regulation Paradigm shift in pricing 
and regulation to properly 
value wind. Integration of 
power and heat. 
Changes in rights and 
obligations of consumers 
and prosumers in the 
electricity sector to sell 
back electricity to grid 
Problems of lack of 
regulation of household 
solar. Current changes 
being made to enable 
consumers to sell back to 
the grid 
Sources Balch, 2015; IRENA, 2012; 
Karnøe and Garud, 2012; 
Karnøe and Karne, 2017 
Grigoleit and Lenkeit, 2011; 
Morris and Jungjohann, 
2016; Richter, 2013a; 
Strunz et al., 2015 
Mitchell et al., 2016; 
Nolden, 2013; OFGEM, 
2017; Seyfang and 
Haxeltine, 2012 
 
We argue that at the level of socio-technical systems, disruption can be understood as an interplay 
between technological and institutional change. On the one hand, the advances in potentially 
disruptive ICT, storage and renewable energy technologies have created a need for institutional 
changes – comprising both informal practices and formal regulatory institutions. On the other hand, 
institutional changes that can be seen as disruptive to centralised large-scale energy systems, for 
example, allowing grid connection with reasonable costs to small distributed energy production and 
facilitating new ownership models, in turn support new disruptive innovations in energy to emerge.  
We will below discuss one specific example of institutional change – the emergence of green industrial 
policy – and its potential influence on energy disruption. While green industrial policy and systemic 
disruption may not seem obviously connected, we show below how industrial policy as an institution 
has been relevant both in sustaining and disrupting the dominant values of the energy system. This is 
of interest to us due, first, to the return of political interest in industrial policy and, second, the 
implications of energy disruption not merely to incumbent business models or the grid but to the 




4. How does green industrial policy link to energy disruption? 
Traditional ‘industrial policy’ is a term that for many, belongs to a different era to the current 
disruptive one. This refers to interventions, where states have played a key ‘top down’ role in 
enhancing the competitiveness of existing industries – deemed important for the country in question 
–  through a range of long-term policy support mechanisms including subsidies, export policies, and 
strategic investment in skills and training to direct industry (Bianchi and Labory, 2006). In the late 
1980s, as neoliberalism swept across the USA and parts of Europe, industrial policy was a term that 
fell out of favour. Instead, it was expected that relying on markets with minimal state intervention 
was the best way of coordinating industrial activities.  
Nevertheless, industrial policy continued to be important in countries relying for a large part of their 
GDP in large exporting industries. For example, in Finland, the pulp and paper industry dominated 
energy policy making for decades until, during the last decade, its importance reduced mostly due to 
declining world paper markets (Kivimaa and Mickwitz, 2011). While not necessarily explicitly 
recognised as industrial policy, in Germany, the provision of long-term finance through national 
investment banks and local banks, the close collaboration of business, finance and trade unions in 
long-term decision making on industry, and the long-term investment in publically funded vocational 
training and export platforms coordinated by the state, can be interpreted as an implicit form of 
industrial policy (Johnstone et al. 2017; Ćetković and Buzogány, 2016; Hancké and Coulter, 2013). 
Certainly Germany is recognised as having ‘industrial policy’ from the perspective of countries like the 
UK (Elliot, 2016). Also, many other European countries still favour tax exemptions or other support 
mechanisms for energy intensive industry. 
Even in countries that have been averse to notions of industrial policy, following the financial crisis of 
2008 and issues surrounding productivity and jobs, there has been a ‘return’ of the concept (Ciuriak, 
2011; Ciuriak and Curtis, 2013; Stiglitz et al., 2013). One such example are the UK plans for new 
industrial strategy. But how does this trend relate to energy disruption? Well, for one, the UK Green 
Paper on Industrial Strategy (BEIS, 2017) relates to the technological aspect of energy disruption, 
outlining energy storage, demand response grid technologies as potential strategic funding options 
and coordinating changes to the energy infrastructure triggered by new technologies. 
Understanding the relationship between disruption in the energy system and industrial policy has 
been one of the areas of research undertaken as part of the Smart Energy Transition project, and 
discussed in work comparing disruption and industrial policy in Denmark, Germany and the UK 
(Johnstone et al. 2017). For a start, it is important to recognise that discussions around industrial policy 
are focussed on broadening the understandings of industrial policy, away from the notion of ‘picking 
winners’ and top down approaches to support existing industries, towards ‘new’ industrial policy that 
is focussed on supporting the creation and promotion of new industrial trajectories (Bianchi and 
Labory, 2006; Dhéret et al., 2014; Stiglitz et al., 2013). One key area in which future growth 
opportunities are thought to lie is the green economy, and the potential for green industrial policy 
combining the creation of new growth and export opportunities for particular countries with 
environmental goals such as Climate Change mitigation (Hallegatte and Vogt-schilb, 2013; Rodrik, 
2014). Green industrial policy is defined by Pegels (2014: 5) as “government intervention to hasten 
the restructuring of the economy towards environmental sustainability”. However, this definition is 
broad, and we argue there are more nuanced ways of understanding industrial policy stemming from 
recent literatures.  
Recent research highlights ‘varieties’ of industrial policy (Andreoni, 2017), and the ‘matrix’ approach 
to understanding industrial policy (Aiginger and Sieber, 2006; O’Sullivan et al., 2013), which include 
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different elements from the role of trade unions and manufacturing policies to comparisons of 
regional and national dimensions. In addition, long-term visions, stable policies and ‘mission oriented’ 
approaches to hastening the direction of industry towards new green technological trajectories have 
been highlighted as important (Mazzucato, 2015; Mazzucato et al., 2015). Thus, implementing a new 
‘green’ industrial vision, in particular when it replaces ‘old’ industrial policy, would be an institutional 
change that can support, or even be part of energy disruption. In practice, following the example of 
Denmark – including a directed reorientation of jobs from fossil to renewable energy industries (Engel 
et al., 2009) – this would mean rethinking the allocation of subsidies and educational focus areas as 
well as create a strategy for redirecting and retraining people employed by the energy sector. Indeed, 
subsequently Denmark has become one of the leading countries in energy technology export (Danish 
Wind Industry Association, 2017), showing a coupling between green industrial policy and domestic 
sustainable energy disruption.  
As we noted above, Denmark and Germany are two countries where energy disruption is thought to 
have advanced the most (Karnøe and Vol, 2012; Quitzow et al., 2016). This is emphasised by the 
decentralisation of energy production and partly changed grid infrastructure but also by the 
destabilisation of incumbent business models coupled with new forms of ownership and production. 
In Germany, traditional utility companies have been severely damaged by the changes that have taken 
place over the past thirty years and are having to radically alter their business models as a 
consequence (Richter, 2013b; Wainstein and Bumpus, 2015). The big four utilities own less than 60% 
of conventional power supply (Clean Energy Wire, 2015) and only 7 % of renewables capacity (The 
Economist, 2013b).The UK, on the other hand, while increasing the proportion of renewables capacity 
in recent years, still operates around a centralised paradigm of energy production, the main 
incumbent utility companies controlling 85% of the energy market (Johnstone et al. 2017; Mitchell et 
al., 2016). For many energy policy stakeholders, the UK represents a low carbon transition without 
multidimensional disruption (through processes of decentralisation and changing business models) 
taking place (Johnstone et al., 2017).  
We argue that, while in some sectors disruption may be primarily a consequence of competition 
between businesses at the firm-level, when it comes to energy disruption, there is a key role for 
institutional change, for example through green industrial policy, in facilitating socially and 
environmentally sustainable energy disruption. As yet, this connection has not been sufficiently 
explored. Discussions on the ‘clean disruption’ in the language of Silicon Valley, neglect processes of 
sustainability. Yet, importantly, a focus on both disruption and industrial policy, emphasises that both 
environmental sustainability and social sustainability should be sought in energy transitions. While in 
such transitions, some will inevitably come out as winners and others as losers, a sustainable energy 
transition should consider a sustainable redirection of jobs – pointing to the importance of green 
industrial policy as a supportive institutional change.  
Thinking again about the systemic nature of disruption, in energy systems perhaps more so than in 
other systems – given the immense sunk costs and the fact that it connects so importantly to the 
overall economy – disruption is not only a matter of established firms being disrupted by start-ups. 
Rather energy disruption entails much broader disruption in terms of the structure of the economy, 
particularly around substantial declines in traditional industries that supported long-term jobs and 
community livelihoods. Thus, related to this, green industrial policy should include a long-term vision 
around new economic opportunities for sustainable manufacturing and service sectors, where the 
state plays an important role in coordinating initiatives around the reskilling and diversification of 
existing fossil-based employment towards the green economy.  
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Returning to the definitional fuzziness raised at the beginning of this piece, while ‘disruption’ is often 
used in a normative sense as a positive development in the world of business and Silicon Valley 
(Alexander, 2016), for parts of society these processes imply significant losses and negative disruption, 
highlighting the importance of a clear strategy around planning for new industrial futures as part of 
the green economy. As in Denmark and to a lesser extent Germany, policies aimed at lessening the 
impact of the decline of fossil fuels through long-term governmental support for industry as green 
industrial policy seems to have been a critical yet overlooked factor in facilitating disruption in the 
energy system (Johnstone et al. 2017). The social effects of rapid departures from fossil fuel based 
economic activity without green industrial policy and relying more on the market rather than state as 
coordinator of employment opportunities is highlighted by the lasting poverty, and social issues still 
in existence in former coal mining regions of the UK (Foden et al., 2014; Johnstone and Hielscher, 
2017). Thus, green industrial policy can be important in managing the negative social sustainability 
consequences of the energy disruption. Such an approach may also reduce barriers to accelerated 
energy disruption, for example, by engaging trade unions and trade associations into a thorough 
discussion on the redirection of employment. Often trade unions resist transitions away from fossil 
fuels due to the issue of potential job losses associated with disruption (Lütkenhorst and Pegels, 2014).  
5. Conclusion 
In this perspective article, we discussed the notions of disruption in connection to institutional change 
briefly and industrial policy more specifically, highlighting definitional issues and inconsistencies which 
make this term potentially problematic. However, in advocating a more systemic rather than firm-
based perspective on disruption, we argue that disruption can offer a useful way of engaging in more 
empirically-driven work to understand the differing ways that business models, ownership, actors and 
networks, policies, and technical and social aspects are implicated in energy transitions. Moreover, 
the interplay between technological and institutional factors seems to be important in energy 
disruption, but has received little specific attention and conceptual development. 
After pointing out the kinds of disruptive changes that are occurring in energy systems, we focussed 
on the under-studied role that ‘green industrial policy’ has played in studies of ‘disruption’. In general, 
energy systems in Western countries range from those with recent significant influence from 
traditional industrial policy typically safeguarding the price and availability of energy to energy-
intensive industry, to those having embraced green industrial policy (implicitly or explicitly) with 
implications on both reducing the fossil-fuel reliance of domestic energy production and creating new 
export industries in sustainable energy. In the latter, long-term visions and a culture of citizen and 
community involvement have played an important role; in the best cases the state has played a 
coordination role in reskilling and diversification of employees. Regarding the latter, we highlighted 
the opportunity to direct disruption not only towards more environmentally sustainable but also 
towards more socially sustainable direction. Thus, in terms of jobs and economic prospects, new 
industrial policy can be an important way in which the negative consequences of disruptive change 
can be to a degree managed and facilitated. Future research could usefully explore further the 
relationship between emerging green industrial policies and energy disruption.  
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